This paper selects 2008-2017 years of relevant investment data and uses the expanded gravity model to conduct an empirical analysis to explore the moderating effect of China's investment motivation and institutional distance on the countries with different levels of development along the "Belt and Road". The main innovation of this paper is to classify the countries in different economic development stages along the "Belt and Road" countries. On the basis of investment motives, this paper discusses how institutional distance is used as a regulatory variable to affect the investment of different motives. The results show that small distance between the host country and China's normative system promotes the expansion of China's investment scale. The distance between regulatory regimes has a reverse regulatory effect on investment driven by market size. For the middle and high income countries, the negative impact of regulatory distance on labor force and technology factor-seeking investment is particularly significant, while for low-income countries, regulatory distance has a very significant positive regulatory effect on natural resource-seeking investment. Finally, this paper provides targeted recommendations based on the conclusions to help investors reduce risk. Investors should make good use of the effect of institutional distance according to their own motives in order to reduce investment costs and risks. Relevant departments need to further improve the domestic regulatory environment and promote the development of OFDI in the future.
Introduction
With the continuous advancement of the globalization process, economic and trade cooperation between countries has become increasingly close. Both the "going out" strategy and the "One Belt, One Road" initiative have shown that China actively participates in cooperation among countries in the world. As 120 Open Journal of Social Sciences they need to pay higher information costs than local companies. In this paper, Habib and Zubawicki (2002) [1] proposed the theory of "institutional close preference", which indicated that investors often prefer countries or regions similar to their own systems when selecting investment objects. Large institutional differences between the investment home country and the host country will inhibit investment to a certain extent. Kolstad and Wiig (2010) [2] indirectly supported this conclusion by analyzing China as a research object. They found that institutional differences may hinder companies from conducting cross-border investment. Cui and Jiang (2009) [3] explored the differences in the determinants of investment between China and developed countries. They proposed that Chinese companies are deeply influenced by the host country system and pay more attention to government support [4] .
Domestic research on location selection started late, but related research has increased in recent years. Liu Haiping, Song Yihong, and Wei Wei (2014) [5] found that the host country's resource elements, historical factors, institutional conditions and joining relevant organizations have an important impact on foreign capital inflows. Fu Shaojun (2018) [6] empirically analyzed the influence of the host government's governance level on China's OFDI location selection. Ji
Shengbao, Li Shuhui, and Ma Shujuan (2018) [7] empirically studied the effect of multi-dimensional distances on the distribution of investment. Tian Yuan and Li Jianjun (2018) [8] analyzed the location preference of China's investment in the countries along the "Belt and Road" from the perspective of resources and systems. He Yaping and Xu Kangning (2018) [9] focused on the influence of the economic system by studying the location distribution of China's OFDI in countries along the "Belt and Road". Di Yuna, You Linqing (2018) [10] used
Heckman two-stage estimation method to empirically study the economic motive and multi-dimensional distance factors in China's investment location selection. Liu Shuangqin and Li Minyan's (2018) [11] research results show that: the normative institutional distance will inhibit China's OFDI, while the regulatory system distance will positively affect the scale of investment. Liu Juan (2018) [12] systematically examined the relationship between the institutional environment of the host country, the orientation of market, resource investment and OFDI. Zhang Yabin (2016) [13] proposed that the improvement of the host country's economic environment has the greatest impact on OFDI. Peng Dongdong and Lin Hong (2018) [14] empirically tested the influence of the institu- Since the empirical part of this article involves a large number of variables, the nomenclature is introduced as follows for the convenience of reading: the dependent variable, the foreign direct investment is named OFDI; six independent variables include the natural resource variable named na, the labor resource variable named la, the technical element variable named tec, the market size variable named gdp, the normative system distance variable named gd, the regulatory system distance variable named gud; the three control variables include the bilateral economic and trade tightness variable named tight, the inflation rate variable named ci, the trade distance variable named trdis.
Model Design and Data Source

Indicator Selection Description
The selection of variables and related descriptions are now shown in Table 1 .
Model Design
By expanding the traditional trade gravity model of Anderson (1979) [19] to construct the investment gravity model, the investment motives such as nature resource, labor cost, market size and technical factor are taken into consideration. 
Independent Variables
This article draws on the practice of Liu Jing (2012) [20] and other scholars to subdivide the institutional distance into the distance between the regulatory system and the normative system, which is used to measure the institutional environmental gap between China and the countries along the "Belt and Road". The specific calculation method is to measure the regulatory and normative institutional distance by the absolute value of the difference between the average values of the three indicators between China and the countries along the "Belt and
Road" in each year.
Discourse rights and accountability distance, political stability and non-riot distance and corruption distance are used to measure the normative institutional distance. The normative system is mainly informal. It is the system that people form in their lives to guide their behavior and decision-making. The normative system distance is mainly reflected in the gap between the investment country and the host country in terms of customs and personal behaviors. Generally speaking, the smaller the distance of the normative system is, the closer the normative system of the two countries is. The transaction cost of the investment is smaller.
Hypothesis 1: Normative institutional distance has a negative impact on the expansion of investment scale.
The regulatory system distance is usually measured by the government efficiency distance and the distance between supervision and the rule of law. On the one hand, the regulatory system of developed countries is perfect, and the relevant requirements for investment will be more stringent. If the regulatory system distance is small, it means high consistency with China. It will help reduce the "Liability of Foreignness" costs brought about by differences in regulatory systems and promote investment; On the other hand, most of the countries along the "Belt and Road" are developing countries. Problems such as inadequate supervision by government, the inefficiency of the relevant departments and imperfect rule of law systems are still serious, so investment risks are high. However, China's investment entities have not reduced or stopped investing in these countries. We can understand from the following two aspects: First, under the framework of "One Belt, One Road", most of China's investment projects in these countries are aimed at helping them to improve domestic infrastructure construction, so they are welcomed by the government and the majority.
Second, countries such as Pakistan, whose abundant natural resource elements can offset the negative impacts caused by the regulatory system environment. 
Control Variables
Based on the existing research, this paper draws on Wu Xianming and Hu
Cuiping [21] 's approach to select the three factors of economical trade closeness, inflation rate and geographical distance as the control variables of this paper.
Bilateral economic and trade tightness (tight): The close economic and trade cooperation between the two countries helps the investment entities to obtain various types of information. Therefore, it is expected that the bilateral trade and economic tightness will be positively correlated with the scale of OFDI.
Inflation rate (ci): A country's high inflation rate means that its macro economy is relatively unstable, which in turn increases the risk of investment. Therefore, it is expected that the inflation rate will be negatively correlated with the scale of OFDI. In order to further compare the differences in investment motives among different income countries and the effect of institutional distances in different types of host countries, the sub-sample analysis is carried out separately based on the analysis of the whole sample countries.
Since the direction of the influence of the regulatory system distance is uncertain, the interaction term between the investment motivation and the regulatory system is added to the model to examine the effect of the regulatory system distance on the OFDI driven by different motives.
Analysis of Empirical Results
According to Table 2 , it can be seen that motivation for seeking the technical elements of the host country in the whole sample is not significant (p > 0. Note: The numbers in parentheses are t values; "*", "**" and "***" indicate the significance of the regression coefficient by 1%, 5% and 10%.
very strong. The market size of the host country is significantly positively correlated with the location choice of China's investment (β = 7.865, 1.4, 2.954; p < 0.01, p < 0.01, p < 0.05), indicates that when choosing the investment location in China, it is more inclined to choose a host country with a larger market size. The natural resource factor coefficient is positive in each sample, and is more significant in low-income countries (β = 0.122, p < 0.05), indicating that the abundant natural resources of low-income countries have a great positive appeal to investment. This shows that the motivation for seeking natural resources in the more developed countries is not significant (p > 0.1). In addition, the labor resources factors of high-income countries and the technical elements of countries of low-income countries are not the main considerations for investment. It is worth noting that the correlation coefficient of the market size in the whole sample and the three sub-samples is significantly positive (β = 7.865, 1.4, 2.954; p < 0.01, p < 0.01, p < 0.05), indicating that the market size of the countries along The results for the control variables are roughly consistent with the expected assumptions. The correlation coefficient of trade distance is negative as expected, indicating that investors tend to choose neighboring countries as investment targets. The inflation rate is a substitute for the macroeconomic stability of the host country. Its correlation coefficient is also negative, indicating that investment tends to flow into a host country with relatively stable macroeconomics. The economic and trade tightness is significantly positively related to China's investment. Therefore, the host country with closer economic and trade ties with China is more attractive to investment entities.
Empirical Analysis of the Effect of Regulatory System Distance
In order to further analyze the effect of regulatory system distance on different internal investment motives, the interaction between institutional distance and investment motivation is introduced into the model to conduct empirical research. The interaction variables are averaged and centralized in advance to avoid multicollinearity with the main variables. The results are shown in Table  3 .
Firstly, for the three groups of host countries at different stages of economic development, the coefficient of the interaction between the regulatory system distance and the market size is significantly negative, (β = −1.343, −3.804, −1.106; p < 0.01, p < 0.05, p < 0.01) which means that the regulatory system distance has a reverse effect on the market-seeking OFDI. Investors are more inclined to invest in host countries similar to China's regulatory system to obtain their market share. Under similar regulatory circumstances, investment entities are relatively Note: The numbers in parentheses are t values; "*", "**" and "***" indicate that the regression coefficients pass the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance test. The variables gn, gg, gl, and gt represent the interactions between the regulatory system distance and natural resources, market size, labor costs, and technical elements.
more familiar with the government and legal system. Investors can use low transaction costs to increase their market share in the host country and increase their international influence.
Secondly, for high-income host countries, the coefficients of interaction between the regulatory system distance and the investment motive are mostly negative, the coefficient of interaction with technical factors is significantly negative at 1% (β = −0.066, p < 0.01), which means that for high-income countries, the regulatory system distance has an adverse impact on the investment driven by different motivations, especially for technology-seeking investment.
For middle-income countries, the coefficient of interaction between labor cost and regulatory system distance is significantly positive at 5% (β = 0.898, p < 0.05), which means that the distance between the host country and China's regulatory system has a significant reverse regulation effect on labor-seeking investment. It shows that investors will also consider the impact of differences in regulatory systems while considering cheap labor resources. When the regulatory system is relatively close, multinational corporations can relatively easily adapt to the local regulatory environment, so they will choose to expand their investment scale.
Finally, for low-income countries, the cross-term correlation coefficient between regulatory system distance and natural resources is significantly positive at the level of 1% (β = 0.0009, p < 0.01), which means that the regulatory system distance has a very significant positive adjustment effect on natural resource-seeking investment. Even if the host country's regulatory system is not perfect, abundant natural energy such as ore metal will be very attractive to
Chinese investors, which can offset the negative impact of the regulatory system to some extent. 
Conclusions and Recommendations
Firstly, this paper analyzes the impact of investment motivations on the scale of OFDI. The motivation for seeking the technical elements of the host country is not significant in the whole sample, and the other three motivation factors are consistent with the previous assumptions. After being divided into three groups, we can find that China's investment motivations for middle and high-income countries are mainly technical elements. The natural and labor resources of low-income countries are the main considerations for investment. As an important decision-making factor that positively influences the choice of investment location, market size has great appeal to investment entities.
Secondly, it analyzes the influence of institutional distance on the overall investment scale. The normative system distance correlation coefficient is significantly negatively correlated with the investment. The conclusions of the whole sample and the group sample are the same. That is, investors are more willing to choose a host country with similar cultural practices to invest to reduce investment costs. In the whole sample and the sample of low-income host countries, the regulatory institutional distance is significantly positively correlated with the investment scale, but in the sample of medium and high-income countries, the result is opposite. The regulatory system distance has a negative effect on the investment scale.
Finally, it discusses the adjustment effect of the regulatory system distance on the investment. In all the samples, the regulatory system has a reverse adjustment effect on the market-oriented investment. For high-income countries, the regulatory system distance has a negative impact on the investment driven by different motivations, especially for technology-seeking investment. For middle-income countries, the regulatory system distance has a significant reverse adjustment effect on labor-seeking investment. For low-income countries, the regulatory system distance has a very significant positive effect on natural resource-seeking investment.
Based on the above conclusions, the following suggestions are proposed for the location selection of Chinese investment entities:
First, China's investment entities should consider the institutional distance between China and the host country when making investment location choices.
In views of the fact that the normative system distance is not conducive to increasing investment, the investment entity should strengthen communication and cooperation with local enterprises and the public and make good use of the advantages of the Chinese population in the host country. They can learn about local customs and habits through intermediaries or organize relevant personnel to conduct overseas exchanges and other means to promote China's excellent culture in order to obtain the cultural identity of local people and reduce transaction costs caused by differences in normative systems. fact that the regulatory system distance has a negative effect on market-seeking investment, it also has a significant hindrance to the labor-seeking and technology-seeking investment in middle and high-income countries. It is necessary to reduce the regulatory system distance between China and the host countries in order to expand the scale of OFDI. On the one hand, it requires investment entities to passively choose investment objects with similar regulatory environment.
On the other hand, it is also necessary for the government to draw attention.
Relevant departments should improve the environment of their own regulatory systems to reduce the gap with the host countries.
Third, it is necessary to establish a relevant risk prediction and prevention system from the beginning of the selection of investment objects to the overseas operations after investment. Most of the countries along the "Belt and Road" are still developing countries. Some countries are facing the threat of violence and terrorist attacks, which greatly increases the possibility of uncertainty in the investment process. Therefore, it is necessary to establish a relatively complete risk assessment and control system, and to do a good job of pre-forecasting, in-process control and post-processing.
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